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HARPER V. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION:
OF PERNICIOUS ABSTRACTIONS AND
THE DEATH OF PRECEDENT
I. INTRODUCTION

Sometimes newly-minted law is challenged immediately. Yet it can
happen that a law will be relied upon for many years before ripening into

a controversy that is finally resolved by the courts. Many of this nation's
state governments-some since the 1920s-have exempted state and

municipal retirees' pensions from state income tax. 1 Prior to the late
1930s, the exemption did not affect federal workers because the "salaries

of most government employees, both state and federal, generally were
thought to be exempt from taxation by another sovereign under the

doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity." 2 However, in 1938, the
Supreme Court held that a tax on the income of state and municipal
employees was not unconstitutional. 3 The following year, in Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe,4 the Supreme Court held that a nondiscriminatory tax on a federal employee's income did not violate the
1. See Duffy v. Wetzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (noting,
in a review of the history of state taxation of pensions, that New York State has
exempted the pensions of state and municipal workers since 1920, incorporating the
exemption into statute and into the New York State Constitution), vacated 113 S. Ct.
3027 (1993) (case remanded for further consideration in light of Harper).
2. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 810 (1989). The doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity traces its roots to McCulloch v. Maryland, wherein
Justice Marshall made the statement, "Mhe power to tax involves the power to destroy
* . .the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create ....
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). Briefly described:
The doctrine of intergovernmentaltax immunity, first established in McCulloch
v. Maryland, is directed at preventing state and local tax authorities from
imposing burdens which interfere with the activities of the federal government
and the exercise of congressional power. Over the past 50 years the scope of
the intergovernmentaltax immunity doctrine has been reduced. The imposition
of a non-discriminatory economic burden upon a federally sponsored activity
is no longer barred. However, taxes remain constitutionally invalid if they are
discriminatory in nature. Even significant differences between entities being
taxed will not justify disparate tax treatment unless the differences can be
shown to be directly related to the inconsistent tax treatment.
Joshua J. Angel and Leonard H. Gerson, Remaining Gains Tax Issues After Decision In
'995 Ffih', N.Y. L.J., Oct. 30, 1992, at 1, 4 (citations omitted).
3. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
4. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
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doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. 5 Almost simultaneously,
Congress enacted the Public Salary Tax Act,' in which it consented to the
non-discriminatory state taxation of federal employees. 7 Thereafter, some
states began to tax compensation-including pensions-paid to federal
employees.' Yet, despite those changes in federal law, states continued
to exempt the pensions of their own state and municipal retirees while
taxing the pensions of other retirees, including, after 1939, the pensions
of retired federal employees.9
In 1989 the Supreme Court abolished this state tax policy when it
handed down its decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury."e
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a state scheme which taxed the
pensions of retired federal workers but not the pensions of retired state
workers was an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity."
Still, Davis did not resolve the
question of the extent of states' refund liabilities stemming from that case
or from other adverse tax decisions. For example, after Davis, many
states acknowledged the unconstitutionality of their own pension tax laws
but refused to refund the monies collected."2 When federal pensioners
subsequently litigated the issue, many of the state courts applied the
doctrine of non-retroactivity,"3 consequently holding that the states need
5. Id.

6. Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, ch. 59, § 84a, 53 Stat. 574 (1939) (current
version at 4 U.S.C. § 111 (1988)).
7. See Davis, 489 U.S. at 810-12.
8. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wetzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(discussing the inception of taxation by the State of New York of federally paid
compensation).
9. See, e.g., id. at 686 (1992) (noting that New York State has exempted the
pensions of State and municipal workers since 1920, incorporating the exemption into its
Constitution). In 1989 "at least" twenty states had "tax or pension statutes that included
exemptions" for state workers. Id.
10. 489 U.S. 803.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Dufy, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684 (challenging New York State's refusal to

refund unconstitutionally collected pension taxes, notwithstanding the Davis decision).
13. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) (analyzing various forms

of non-retroactivity and arguing that the doctrine is better employed as an additional
factor to be considered when determining remedy, rather than as a tool for resolving
temporal choice-of-law problems). The doctrine of non-retroactivity was developed in
the 1960s by the Warren Court as a means of lessening the impact of many of that
Court's precedent-shattering decisions. In barest outline, the doctrine could be applied
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not refund the taxes.' 4 The Supreme Court addressed state refund
liability in a series of tax-related cases that followed the Davis decision
culminating
15 with its recent decision in Harperv. Virginia Department of
Taxation.
Where federal law is concerned Harper virtually abolished the
doctrine of non-retrospectivity. The HarperCourt held that if a court does
not explicitly apply the rule of a case solely in a prospective fashion, no
other court may thereafter deny retroactive relief to a litigant who wins as
a result of that rule. Instead, the new rule must be applied "in all cases
still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such
events predate or postdate [the] announcement of the rule."16 By default
this precept holds sway although the parties to the precedent-setting case
never briefed the question of whether to apply the rule and although the
deciding court never considered the issue. No matter how loudly the facts
of a subsequent case might scream out for the equitable application of the
non-retrospectivity doctrine, that doctrine may no longer be used if it was
not employed in the first case.
The Harperdecision also raised issues pertaining to state remedy law
and federal procedural due process.' 7 In an attempt to suggest that
questions of retrospectivity might properly be considered in terms of
remedy, the Harper Court reiterated the holding of an earlier case,
McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco.'8 Just as it
had three years earlier in McKesson, the Harper Court indicated that a
taxpayer who is limited to post-deprivation process is entitled to backward
looking relief, but a taxpayer who is afforded sufficient pre-deprivation
to a case in which the claimant based his or her legal theory on a prior (usually recent)
Court decision which had overturned established precedent. The Court, using a
balancing test, would then decide "whether . . . [the] 'new' constitutional decision
should be denied retroactive effect." Id. at 1733-34. See also discussion infra notes 99157 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Duffy, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684 (holding under the doctrine of nonretroactivity that New York State need not refund the unconstitutionally collected pension
taxes).
15. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
16. See id. at 2517.
17. See id. at 2518-20. Justice Thomas wrote the Harperopinion which is broken
down into three parts. Part I examines the background of the case. See id. at 2513-16.
In part II, Justice Thomas addresses the question of whether a court may refuse to apply
the rule of a previously decided case. See id. at 2516-18. In part III, he points out the
limits of state law concerning remedy in relation to federal due process requirements.

See id. at 2518-20.
18. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
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relief is not necessarily due a tax refund. 9 Like drowning men, several
States grasped desperately at this portion of the Harper opinion. These
states persisted in their refusal to provide tax refunds to affected federal
pensioners. They argued that refunds were not due because adequate predeprivation process had been available to the federal pensioners who
brought suit in the state courts after the Davis decision.'
Thus, three strands of constitutional doctrine can be traced through
Davis and Harper and several other tax cases which intervened between
the two.
Those doctrines are intergovernmental tax immunity, 2'
retrospectivity,' and remedy versus procedural due process balancing.'
Yet, while the cases that addressed those doctrines answered certain

Constitutional questions, they also raised other issues requiring resolution.

Part II of this note first surveys the development of the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, addressing the Davis decision
and the cases which led up to it.'
Second, it examines the legal

controversy surrounding the various theories of non-retroactive application
of judicial rules.

5

Third, Part II looks at the litigation spawned by the

Davis decision, which ultimately led to the controversy decided in
Harper.' Finally, Part II concludes with a discussion of the Harper
decision, which arose because of Davis and in which the Court most
recently attempted to deal with the issues concerning non-retroactivity.?
Part HI of this note examines the various state responses to the Harper
decision and assesses the consequences of that decision. This note ends
19. See Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2519-20.
20. Frank Jackman et al., Tax Refund Suit Drags State Into High Court, DAILY
NEWs (New York), Feb. 23, 1994, at 13. "'Of 23 states affected by the... [Davis]
ruling . . . eight [are] still fighting the retirees over the refunds ....
Those cases
involve hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes', the National Association of Retired
Federal Employees said in court papers." Id.
21. See Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 814-17 (1989) (holding
taxation of federal pensioners, but not of state pensioners, violates intergovernmental
immunity).
22. See Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2517-18 (banning selective application of new rules).
See also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 509 U.S. 529, 537-38 (1991)
(banning selective application of a new rule when it had been applied in the case deciding
the new rule).
23. See Harper,113 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (indicating that when a state denies sufficient
pre-deprivation process, due process values require a minimum post-deprivation relief).
24. See infra notes 29-97 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 98-146 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 158-228 and accompanying text.
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with an examination of the possible reasons why the state courts seemed
so obstinate in refusing to follow Supreme Court precedent, and concludes
that the unhappy (for the states) result of the Davis/Harper line of cases,
coupled with the unintended lesson derived from them, might have caused
the state courts to misinterpret those decisions.'
II. FROM DAVIS TO HARPER
A. Intergovernmental Tax Immunity: Necessary Limit
On the Power to Destroy or Pernicious
Abstraction
1. Background to Davis
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury was the latest in a line of
cases hinging on the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity dating
back almost to the founding of this nation.' The doctrine arose from the
seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland.' The McCulloch Court held
that the State of Maryland could not tax a branch of the federal bank. 3
In that decision, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that Congress's right to
charter a bank was derived from the necessary and proper clause of the
Constitution.2
Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that among the
congressional powers enumerated in the Constitution were the powers to
raise mone 3 and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution . . . this power and others. He reasoned
that in order for Congress to effectively exercise those powers, Congress
required the authority to select the means necessary to achieve its desired
ends. Because Congress required the authority, the Chief Justice
28.
29.
30.
31.

See infra notes 229-303 and accompanying text.
See 489 U.S. 803, 810 (1989).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also supra note 2.
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436-37.

32. Id. at 411-12. The necessary and proper clause grants Congress the power "[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, ci. 18.
33. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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concluded that Congress had the right to charter the bank-a reasonable
means to a permissible end.3'
Finally, Chief Justice Marshall explained that, because the Supremacy
Clause36 raised a federal governmental interest to a position of
superiority over a conflicting state interest, and because the "power to tax
involve[d] the power to destroy," 37 a state should not have the authority
to tax an instrument of the federal government.3" He also argued that
state citizens do not require similar protection because they possess the
political power to take their own elected officials to task for any insidious
or destructive taxes imposed upon them.39 In contrast, the federal
government does not have sufficient political protection from taxes
imposed on it by a state government because most federal constituents are
not also constituents of that state government.40
In the cases immediately following McCulloch, the intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine was used not only to proscribe state taxation of
"direct government functions . . . but also
secondary or derivative
41
transactions relating to the performance of governmental functions."
For example, the Court, in Plowden Weston v. City Council of
Charleston,42 relying on McCulloch, held that a tax on United States
bonds was an unconstitutional interference with the legitimate power of the
federal government.43 The Court, in another early case, Dobbins v.
Commissioners,' held that federal government employees were
"instrument[s]" of the government whose salary could not be taxed by a
35. See McCulloch 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400-25.
36. The clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
37. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 431.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 428-29.
40. See id.
41. 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 13.9(a), at 811 (1986).
42. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).

43. Id. But see People v. Commissioners, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 244 (1866) (holding
that the owner of bank shares cannot deduct income proportionately derived from
investments in government securities).
44. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
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state.' The Court used this same notion to exempt a state officer or
employee from federal tax as -well.' Other cases extended the doctrine
to shield government leaseholders from taxation. 7
As the body of law on intergovernmental tax immunity expanded, the
underlying logic of that doctrine came under attack. For example, in
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox," the Court followed the
traditional reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, holding that
the State of Mississippi could not tax gasoline sold to the United States
Coast Guard by a private corporation. Yet, in his dissenting opinion,
Justice Holmes criticized the majority's rationale:
It seems to me that the State Court was right [in affirming the
tax]. I should say plainly right, but for the effect of certain dicta

of Chief Justice Marshall which culminated in or rather were
founded upon his often quoted proposition that the power to tax
is the power to destroy. In those days it was not recognized as it
is today that most of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of
degree. If the States had any power it was assumed that they had
all power, and that the necessary alternative was to deny it
altogether. But this Court which so often has defeated the attempt
to tax in certain ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or
otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax.
The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court
sits. The power to fix rates is the power to destroy if unlimited,
but this Court while it endeavors to prevent confiscation does not
prevent the fixing of rates.49
Eventually the Court placed limits on the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity.' Subsequent cases held that states may
assess that which is normally exempted from taxation as long as Congress
45. Id.
46. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127-28 (1870) (holding that
Congress may not impose a tax on an employee, i.e., an instrumentality, of the state).
47. See ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 41, § 13.9(a), at 811 n.5.
48. 277 U.S. 218 (1938).
49. Id. at 223 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
50. See ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 41, § 13.9(a), at 812; Bernard T. Ferrari,
Washington v. United States: A McCulloch Progeny, 29 LoY. L. REV. 1164, 1166-67
(1983).
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grants consent.51 However, fine distinctions were sometimes drawn.
States were permitted to tax the real property of federally chartered

corporations," but they could not tax the realty of corporations doing
business with the federal government if Congress granted specific
exemption from taxation to such corporations. 53
Two recurrent themes run through the cases that deal with the
doctrine's limits. First is the issue of congressional consent. A state may
not tax a federal entity without it.' Second, a tax that is consented to

by Congress is nonetheless impermissible if it discriminates against the
federal government.'
51. See, e.g., Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1865) (Although
Congress had authorized the states to tax the shares of national banking associations, the
Court held unconstitutional a state tax of a banking association, the capital of which was
wholly invested in U.S. stocks and bonds, because the tax adversely discriminated against
such investments.
The Court nonetheless rejected the argument that it was
unconstitutional for Congress to permit a tax on the bonds). The Van Allen Court stated:
It is said that Congress possesses no power to confer upon a State authority to
be exercised which has been exclusively delegated to that body by the
Constitution, and, consequently, that it cannot confer upon a State the
sovereign right of taxation; nor is a State competent to receive a grant of any
such power from Congress .... But as it respects a subject-matter over which
Congress and the States may exercise a concurrent power, but from the
exercise of which Congress, by reason of its paramount authority, may exclude
the States, there is no doubt Congress may withhold the exercise of that
authority and leave the States free to act.
Id. at 585.
52. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) ("[the
ban against taxation] does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank").
But see Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886) (indicating a state can't directly
tax land owned by the United States).
53. See Thomson v. Union Pac. R.R., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579 (1869).
54. See, e.g., British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299
U.S. 159 (1936) (holding a state may tax the profits under a federal lease if there is
congressional consent); Baltimore Nat'l Bankv. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 209 (1936)
(holding that a state can tax shares owned by a U.S. agency if Congress consents).
55. See, e.g., United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (holding that
federally-owned housing provided to U.S. Forest workers as compensation was taxable
as long as the tax was imposed on equally situated non-federal state citizens); United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) (holding that profits derived from
government owned real property are taxable if the tax is non-discriminatory); Metcalf &
Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (holding that the salaries of engineers employed
by a private corporation which provides consultation to the federal government are not
exempt from state taxes if the taxes are not discriminatory).
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In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Court "abruptly turned the tide"
on the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.' In James v. Dravo
Contracting Co. ,57 the Court held that an income tax on construction
company earnings from government projects was not unconstitutional. 8
Dravo instituted the "legal incidence doctrine," rejecting the notion that
a state tax placed a burden on the federal government. 5 9 "The essence
of . . . [the legal incidence] doctrine is that a state tax is valid if not
directly levied on the federal government, if not discriminatory, and if not
declared invalid by Congress."'
Soon after Dravo, in Helvering v.
Gerhardt,61 the Supreme Court held that it was not unconstitutional for
the federal government to impose a non-discriminatory income tax upon
the salaries of state employees.62
Following closely on the heels of Gerhardt the Court reversed the
New York State Court of Appeals in Graves v. New York ex reL
O'Keefe, 3 holding that a state tax on the salary of an employee of the
federally-created Home Owner's Loan Corporation did not
unconstitutionally burden the federal government.' The O'Keefe Court
found that the state tax was not a direct tax on the Home Owner's Loan
Corporation, but rather a tax on the property of the individual taxpayer.'
The Court further concluded that the tax on the employee's salary was
non-discriminatory. 6
In O'Keefe, the Court narrowly construed the intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine. The Court found that Congress had not intended for
Home Owner's Loan Corporation employees to be exempt from state
taxation because, upon enactment of the enabling legislation, Congress had
been silent on the issue of employee immunity from state taxation.67
56. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 41, § 13.9(a), at 812.
57. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
58. Id.at 161.
59. See Ferrari, supra note 50, at 1167 (footnotes omitted) (discussing Dravo).
60. Id.
61. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
62. Id.at 424.
63. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
64. Id.at 487.
65. Id.at 480.
66. Id. at 484-87.
67. Id. The O'Keefe Court stated:
It is true that the silence of Congress, when it has authority to speak, may
sometimes give rise to an implication as to the Congressional purpose....
But there is little scope for the application of that doctrine to the tax immunity
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Writing for the majority, Justice Stone determined that a "non-

discriminatory general tax" on a government employee was neither an
undue burden on the government nor unconstitutional unless explicitly
exempted by Congress.'

In his concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter echoed the criticism
made by Justice Holmes at an earlier time:'

The arguments upon which McCulloch v. Maryland... rested
had their roots in actuality. But they have been distorted by
sterile refinements unrelated to affairs.
These refinements

derived authority from an unfortunate remark in the opinion of
McCulloch v. Maryland. Partly as a flourish of rhetoric and
partly because the intellectual fashion of the times indulged in a
free use of absolutes, Chief Justice Marshall gave currency to the
phrase that 'the power to tax involves the power to destroy.' . .
. All these doctrines of intergovernmental immunity have until

recently been moving in the realm of what Lincoln called
"pernicious abstractions. "'

Shortly after the Gerhardtdecision, Congress passed the Public Salary
Tax Act7 ' which waived the immunity from state taxation previously
given to federal employees.'
However, O'Keefe was handed down
before the amendment became law.' "In effect, § 111 simply codified
the result in O'Keefe and foreclosed the possibility that subsequent judicial
of governmental instrumentalities.... Silence of Congress implies immunity
no more than does the silence of the Constitution. It follows that when...
Congress has disclosed no intention with respect to the claimed immunity..
. there is no ground for implying a constitutional immunity.
Id. at 479-80.
68. Id. at 487.
69. See supra text accompanying note 50.
70. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. at 488-90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
71. Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, ch. 59, § 84a, 53 Stat. 574 (1939) (current
version at 4 U.S.C. § 111 (1988)).
72. 4 U.S.C. § 111 states, in part:
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal
service as an officer or employee of the United States . . . by a duly
constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not
discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay
or compensation.
73. See Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 811 (1989) (discussing
the history of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity).

19941

NOTE: HARPER v. VIRGINIA

reconsideration of that case might reestablish the broader interpretation of
the immunity doctrine."'74
Although both the Supreme Court and Congress had acted to shepherd
the doctrine away from the realm of "'pernicious abstractions'" ' by
narrowly proscribing its limits, the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine had by no means been entirely eliminated. For example, twenty
years after the Public Salary Tax Act was enacted, in Phillips Chemical
Co. v. Dumas Independent School District,7' the Supreme Court held that
an ad valorem tax on a company's use of federal realty was
unconstitutional because the similar use of state land was taxed at a lower
rate with no "significant differences" to justify the two classes.' Thus,
although the challenged policy had been relied upon for many years, the
Supreme Court in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury,7" like the
Michigan courts that first heard the case, was not without the guiding light
of precedent when it found itself confronted with a federal pensioner's
claim that a state tax, which exempted state retirees' pensions but not the
pensions of federal retirees, was unconstitutional.79
2. Davis: Progenitor of Harper
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury arose because a retired
federal worker residing in Michigan petitioned for a tax refund in state
court. The pensioner claimed that the state income tax scheme, which
exempted state pensions but not federal pensions, violated the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine because it was unlawfully
discriminatory.'
The Supreme Court heard the case after the
pensioner's claim failed in the Michigan courts."'
74. Id. at 812.
75. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. at 490 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
76. 361 U.S. 376 (1960).
77. Id. at 387.
78. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
79. Id. The Davis Court, in reviewing the history of the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity, examined several related cases beginning with
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), and including Phillips Chem.
Co. v. Dwnas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960). See id.
80. See id. at 805-07. Thepensionerelaimed "that the State's inconsistenttreatment
of state and federal retirement benefits discriminated against federal retirees in violation
of 4 U.S.C. § 111, which preserves federal employees' immunity from discriminatory
state taxation." Id. at 807.
81. See id. at 806-07.
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As a threshold matter, the Davis Court found that pension income was
taxable compensation within the meaning of O'Keefe and the Public Salary
Tax Act." The Court then inquired whether there were significant
differences to justify the two taxpayer classes."
In making its
determination, the Court rejected a "rational" basis analysis,' stating,
"the relevant inquiry is whether the inconsistent tax treatment is directly
related to, and justified by, 'significant differences between the two
classes.'" '
Applying this standard, the Davis court rejected as being
"wholly beside the point" the argument that the tax preference served as
an inducement to retain qualified employees.' Furthermore, the Court
dismissed the somewhat true but over-inclusive argument that a tax
preference equalized a disparity between the less "munificent" state
pension benefits and the more generous federal pensions. Accordingly,
the Court agreed with the federal pensioner, holding that it was unlawfully
discriminatory for a state to exempt the pensions of its own retired
workers while subjecting federal pensions to an income tax.8"
Justice Stevens' lone dissent reverberated with the prior criticisms
leveled by Justice Holmes and Justice Frankfurter against the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.89 He accused the Court of
having forgotten "the ratio decidendi of our holding in McCulloch v.
Maryland."' Justice Stevens also pointed out that the facts of Davis did
not support the original justification for the doctrine as offered by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.9" Justice Stevens argued
82. Id. at 808-09.
83. See id. at 816-17.
84. See id. at 816.
85. Id. at 816 (quoting Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S.
376, 383 (1960)).
In determining whether this standard of justification has been met, it is
inappropriate to rely solely on the mode of analysis developed in our equal
protection cases. We have previously observed that "our decisions in [the
equal protection] field are not necessarily controlling where problems of
intergovernmental tax immunity are involved," because "the Government's
interests must be weighed in the balance."
Id. at 816 (quoting Phillips Chem., 361 U.S. at 385).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 816-17.
88.
89.
50, 70.
90.
91.

Id. at 817.
See id. at 818-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes
Davis, 489 U.S. at 828.
See id. at 821; supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
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that there was no threat to the federal government from the Michigan tax
on federal employees' pension income because the tax applied "equally to
the vast majority" of state citizens.' This served as a political counter
to any attempted unfairness of the state legislature. 3 Thus he concluded
that94a "discriminatory" tax should not result in a per se invalidation of that
tax.
Whether or not the doctrine is indeed based on "sterile refinements"
that are "derived . . . from an unfortunate remark,"9' it is difficult to
give credence to an argument that claims Davis created "new" law. Davis
merely confirmed the viability of the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine.9' Under the doctrine, Congress may consent to an otherwise
impermissible state tax by remaining silent. Yet it is illegal discrimination
for a state to impose a tax on federal pensioners when state pensioners are
exempt from the tax. It is illegal even though "the vast majority" of the
state's citizens are also included within the scheme, and despite the fact
that the tax policy had been relied upon by the state and had gone
unchallenged for half a century. 9
B. Non-Retroactivity: Choice-of-Law Issue or
Remedial Issue
1. The Controversy over Non-Retroactivity Prior to Davis
Unlike the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, which had its
genesis in the early years of this Nation,98 the notion of nonretroactivity 9 was developed much more recently, by the Warren Court
in the last half of the current century." ° Simply stated, the doctrine is
92. 489 U.S. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 821 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,488-89 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). See supratext accompanying note 70.
96. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803.
97. Id. at 821.
98. See supratext accompanying notes 29-47.
99. See generally, Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 13 (stating the doctrine has also
been variously denominated "retroactivity," and "prospectivity" by the commentators and
judges who refer to it); Timothy B. Sherman, Davis v. Michigan and The Doctrine of
Retroactivity: States' Refund for Taxation of FederalPensionIncome, 4 B.Y.U. J. PUB.
L. 507 (1990) (same) (referring to the doctrine as "non-retrospectivity," and
"retrospectivity").
100. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1733-34.
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such that a court, after balancing certain factors, may decline to apply to

the case at hand a "new" rule that was announced in a previous
decision.' 0 1 The doctrine has sparked a great deal of debateyu
The debate grew out of two diametrically opposed views of the

function of judges and courts." °

Normally, once the Court decides a

case, the ensuing rule applies retroactively." °4
This reflects the
traditional view of judicial rule-making, the roots of which can be traced
back to Blackstone.10 5 In its most rigid form, this rule holds "that the
function of courts is to apply the law, not make it, and that judges, once
they have found the law, have no warrant to refuse to apply it.""
In contrast to this Blackstonian (or declaratory) outlook is the view
that traces its lineage to the positivism of H. L. A. Hart and J. Austin,
whereby judges are often required to make new law.10 7 In essence,
positivism views law as a "system of rules."10 Although the courts
should adhere to these rules, there are times when "their application is
uncertain ... [and] judges have no alternative but to make law.""

Once it is recognized that the court sometimes makes "new" law, the
question arises: what, if anything, should be done with respect to cases
where "old" law was applied but "new" law was later announced.110

101. See id. at 1733.
102. See, e.g., id. at 1734 ("non-retroactivity decisions attracted a swarm of
protests").
103. See id. at 1758-64. The dispute focuses on whether judges "make law or
rather find and declare it." Id. at 1758.
104. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 529-30
(1991) (holding that a state may not refuse to apply the rule promulgated in a prior case,
where, in the prior case, the Court found that a state excise tax which discriminated
against out-of-state producers was unconstitutional and remanded for remedial action)
See also infra text accompanying notes 179-192.
105. See Fallon & Meltzer, supranote 13, at 1734. But see RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 24-25 (1983), in which Judge Posner suggests that although
it appeared Blackstone viewed a judge's proper role as "merely a passive transmitter"
of the law, Blackstone was in fact "trying to rationalize judicial creativity in adapting the
common law to contemporary social needs."
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1758, 1760.
108. Id. at 1760.
109. Id.(citation omitted).
110. See generally id. at 1738-58 (discussing the approaches taken by the Supreme
Court to various aspects of this question).
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One way to deal with the problem is to view prospectivity as a choice-oflaw issue."' Thus, once a court has determined that:
application [of the new law] would have a harsh and disruptive
effect on those who relied on prior law[,] . . . [i]f the operative
conduct or events occurred before the law-changing decision, a
court should apply the law prevailing at the time of the conduct.
If the operative conduct or events occurred after the decision, so
that any reliance on old precedent would be unjustified, a court
should apply new law.'
Viewed from the choice-of-law perspective, there are three ways to
apply a judicial decision. One is the traditional, Blackstonian method,
which requires that if the "principles and precedents antedate the events
on which the dispute turns," full retroactive application of the law is given
both to the case before the court and to all similar cases, subject to
procedural limitations such as the statute of limitations."'
Another
option is pure prospectivity, whereby the court announces a new rule but
declines to utilize it in the case before it, applying the new rule only in
future cases." 4 The third choice is selective retrospectivity which applies
a rule to the case before the court, but the question of whether to apply it
to other
cases is left to the discretion of the courts deciding those
5
cases.1
As an alternative to the doctrine from a choice-of-law perspective, it
has been argued that the concept of prospectivity more suitably belongs
within the framework of the law of remedy. 6 Proponents argue that
this eliminates the difficulties and inconsistencies encountered when the
selective or the pure form of prospectivity is employed as a temporal
choice of law." 7 In response to the assertion that non-retroactive rulemaking usurps legislative prerogative and violates Article Il of the
111. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 171, 179-81
(1990) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J.). In deciding whether to apply the rule of a
prior case that held a highway use tax to be unconstitutional, the court applied a threepart balancing test. After weighing the three factors, the Court determined that the
"new" rule from the prior case should not be applied to those events at issue which had
occurred prior to the announcement of the "new" rule.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 191.
See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534 (1991).
See id. at 536.
See id. at 537.
See generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 13.
See id. at 1797-1807.
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Constitution,"' proponents of the remedial viewpoint answer that it has
not been unknown for the Court to give what could be "said to constitute
a forbidden 'advisory opinion,'""9 even in Marbury v. Madison."
An additional argument made by proponents of the remedial view is that
the limited manner in which issues come before the Court sometimes
constrains the Court from making rules that will bind all future
parties."'
In response to the contention that non-retroactivity makes it too easy
to change existing law,' proponents of the remedial framework argue
that there is no "correct pace" at which change should occur." z
Opponents of non-retrospectivity also assert that use of the doctrine has a
chilling effect upon the law's development because a rational litigant
would be less likely to assume the expense of litigation if there is a
diminished chance of receiving a damage award.124 In reply it is said
that such an effect is unlikely, at least with certain types of litigation-tax
litigation for instance-because a litigant has a stake in preventing future
unconstitutional conduct as well as in seeking a refund."Z
Advocates who wish to place non-retroactivity within the law of
remedies claim there are two overriding principles which must be
considered when addressing the law of constitutional remedies."2
The
first principle is that individual harms should be redressed. 12 The
second principle is that the remedy should reinforce "structural
values."" Proponents argue that the second principle is superior to the
first and that an interest in redress of an individual harm may yield to an
interest in the reinforcement of structural values." Thus, for example,
government decision-makers are granted qualified-immunity from tort
118. See id. at 1734.
119. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1798-99 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 316 (1989)).
120. 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to
issue mandamus directing the delivery of William Marbury's commission, yet taking the
occasion to discourse at length on the subject of judicial supremacy).
121. See Fallon & Metzer, supra note 13, at 1806.
122. See id. at 1734.
123. See id.at 1804.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1787-91.
127. Id. at 1787.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1791.
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liability because there is a need not to discourage governmental decision-

making."3 Seen in this light, it is argued that non-retroactivity has no
place in deciding which law to apply to a particular case. Rather, non-

retroactivity is simply one factor to be weighed along with many other
factors in applying the two principles of Constitutional remedial decisionmaking to a case before the Court.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, for the court, viewed the non-

retroactivity doctrine as a choice-of-law question.13'

The Court first

accepted and utilized the doctrine in the context of a criminal proceeding

in Linkletter v. Walker.

2

In Linkletter, the Court weighed the

consequences of retroactive application, and, as a result, declined to apply
the exclusionary rule 33 which had been announced in the prior case,
Mapp v. Ohio.'"
Subsequent to Linkletter, the Court refined the
doctrine in Stovall v. Denno, establishing thereby a rule of selective
prospectivity. 5 While in effect, the rule was applied in as many as

twenty-five criminal cases."
Initially, both activists and conservatives alike embraced
prospectivity. 37 For a time, conservatives saw prospectivity as a means
to limit the damage done by an activist court.1 38 But conservatives soon

suffered a change of heart. They came to view prospectivity as an aid to
the Court in transforming the law because application of the doctrine
alleviated the sometimes disruptive consequences of stare decisis.139 The
130. See id. at 1792.
131. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (O'Connor, J.). "Mhe Court has never equated its retroactivity principles with
remedial principles." Id. at 189.
132. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
133. Id. at 636-40.
134. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
135. 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (holding, in a habeas corpus proceedingwhich collaterally
challenged the admission of tainted evidence and which was argued and decided
simultaneously with United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), that the rule announced in those cases, which excludes
admission of such evidence, did not apply in the instant case). "Under Stovall, a new
rule always applied to the case in which it was announced. Only in a second case did
the Court determine whether the new decision would apply to other conduct occurring
prior to announcement." Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1741.
136. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1743.
137. See K. David Steele, ProspectiveOverrulingand the JudicialRole After James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1345, 1351 (1992).
138. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1739-44.
139. See id. at 1743.
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conservative position ultimately prevailed; in 1987 the Court handed down
its opinion in Griffith v. Kentucky,

criminal cases on direct review. "141

4

mandating "full retroactivity to

The doctrine survived longer in the civil sphere. The Court, initially
influenced by the Linkletter and Stovall decisions, adopted prospectivity
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson. 42 Chevron was initiated by a worker
who was injured on an off-shore platform. The Chevron Court recognized

the validity of a prior decision which mandated application of the more
restrictive Louisiana statute of limitations rather than the admiralty laches
doctrine which had previously been adhered to and upon which the
plaintiff had, in good faith, depended. Nonetheless, for reasons of

reliance and equity, the Court held that it would not apply the "new" rule
to the litigants in Chevron, thus allowing the plaintiff to proceed with his
otherwise time-barred claim.1 43
In Chevron, in order to determine whether the rule in a previouslydecided case should be given prospective-only effect in a case at hand, the
Court promulgated a three-part test which was used in civil cases for
twenty more years afterward.'"
The Court did not conclusively
abandon the doctrine or the Chevron analysis until it decided Harper v.
140. 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (deciding whether the prohibition against the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, previously declared unconstitutional in
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), should be applied retroactively to all cases on
direct review, the court held "that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions
is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or
not yet final").
141. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1734.
142. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
143. Id. at 98.
144. See id.at 106-07. The three-part Chevron test is:
First, the decision to be applied non-retroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants
may have relied[,] . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed ....
Second, . . . 'we must weigh
the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule
in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will
further or retard its operation.'... Finally, .. . [we must weigh] the inequity
imposed by retroactive application.
Id. at 106-07 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) (citations

omitted).
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Virginia Department of Taxation,14 which was the direct offshoot of
Davis v. Michigan Department Of Treasury.'
2. The Davis-spawned Litigation
Davis47 led the Court to the prospectivity question because many
states found themselves faced with dire economic consequences resulting
from that decision. Twenty-eight states were affected due to the fact that
the case had important consequences for a large number of state
governments.'" At least one state, Missouri, reacted by raising its sales
tax to pay for refunds to federal pensioners. 9 Some states enacted
legislation to eliminate from their tax laws those exemptions and
exclusions which unlawfully discriminated between federal pensions on the
one hand and state and local pensions on the other.'
Davis also
"spawned a mass of litigation in many States on behalf of Federal retirees
51
seeking... refunds of taxes paid."
Many states claimed Davis should only be applied prospectively. 5 2
They did so despite then-current uncertainty about the continued vitality
of the non-retroactivity doctrine as derived from Chevron. This was
because the Griffith decision had terminated the use of the doctrine in
criminal matters. 53 More doubts about the viability of the doctrine
145. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993); cf. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529, 552 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the plurality's holding
"seriously curtails... the Chevron inquiry").
146. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
147. Id.
148. Carol Douglas, States Vary in PensionIncome Tax EqualizationMeasures, 44
TAX NOTES 373, 373 (July 24, 1989).
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Duffy v. Wetzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (Duffy was
itself one of the many cases "spawned" by Davis), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 3027 (1993) (case
remanded for further consideration in light of Harper). See also Albin C. Koch,
American Trucking's 'Catch-22' Should Not Affect Most Taxpayer Claims In Current
State Tax Disputes, 51 TAX NOTES 1043, 1054 (May 27, 1991) ("This issue is being
contested in some 24 states, and large amounts of revenue are involved in most of
them.").
152. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wetzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684 (holding under the doctrine
of non-retroactivity that New York State need not refund unconstitutionally collected
pension taxes).
153. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
See supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
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were stirred up by a case decided soon after Davis. In James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia,"5 the Court held that "[it is error] to refuse
to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the
rule has already done so." 155 Some states involved in post-Davis
litigation nevertheless refused to make refunds to the affected pensioners,
although they acknowledged the unconstitutionality of the exemption.' m
The shadow cast upon the non-retroactivity doctrine by the Griffith and the
James B. Beam decisions was seemingly ignored. The rationale most
frequently used by the states that still refused to provide tax refunds was
that the Davis decision satisfied the three-part Chevron analysis. 57
3. Three Attempts to Resolve the Controversy
a. American Trucking: Non-Retroactivity as a
Choice-of Law Issue
Before the Davis-spawned pension cases reached finality, the Supreme
Court decided three other cases that added to the brew of confusion and

complexity.

Each of the three concerned a state's refusal to refund

unconstitutionally collected taxes.' 58 Two, McKesson Corp. v. Division
of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco5 9 and American Trucking Ass'ns
154. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
155. Id. at 540 (Souter, J., with one Justice concurring and four Justices concurring
in the judgment).
156. See, e.g., Michael T. Petrik, Georgia:State Supreme Court Rules Out DavisType Case Refund, 3 STATE TAX NoTES 836, 836-37 (Dec. 7, 1992) (relating the
Georgia Supreme Court's denial of a refund to federal pensioners based on a narrow
interpretation of state law which provides for refunds only if the tax is collected
"illegally" as distinguished from "unconstitutionally"); James Morgan, DOR Asks
Extension To Act on FederalRetirement Income Claims, 3 STATE TAX NoTES 601, 601
(Oct. 26, 1992) (Wisconsin Department of Revenue denying refunds for years prior to
Davis case); John Spirtos, Supreme Court:State Tax Preview, 3 STATE TAX NoTES 492,
492 (Oct. 5, 1992) ("Virginia Supreme Court denied the taxpayers' claims for retroactive
relief"); James Morgan, Wisconsin: DOR Rejects Federal Retiree Pension Refunds, 3
STATE TAX NOTES 51, 51 (July 13, 1992) (Wisconsin denied refunds pending further
litigation).
157. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wetzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684, 690-91 (using a Chevron
analysis to determine that the tax relief due federal pensioners as a result of Davis need
not be applied retroactively).
158. See, e.g., Koch, supra note 152, at 1044-45 (expressing hope that the
uncertainty created by two Supreme Court decisions would be resolved by the soon-to-bedecided third case).

159. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
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v. Smith,1" were handed down a little over a year after Davis.161 The
third, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,162 was decided a year
after McKesson and American Trucking.
American Trucking concerned a suit brought by a truckers' association
challenging an Arkansas flat-use tax on the ground that the taxing scheme
interfered with commerce because out-of-state truckers paid proportionally
more under the tax than in-state truckers." a Relying on precedent, the
Arkansas court upheld the tax. 1" As a result, the petitioners appealed

to the Supreme Court which "held" in abeyance the petitioners' appeal
pending the outcome of a similar case then before the Court."a When
the Court subsequently declared that a flat-use tax was
unconstitutional, 1" it remanded American Trucking "for further
consideration in light of Scheiner."167
When American Trucking later reached the Arkansas Supreme Court

(after travelling a circuitous procedural route), that court used the Chevron
test" to apply Scheiner prospectively, thus denying a tax refund to the
out-of-state truckers." 6 On a writ of certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Arkansas court."
Confusion resulted17 for three reasons: (1) American Trucking was only
160. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
161. McKesson, 496 U.S. 18 (argued Mar. 22, 1989, reargued Dec. 6, 1989) and
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (argued Mar. 22, 1989,
reargued Dec. 6, 1989). McKesson and American Trucking were consolidated by the
court and argued just six days prior to when Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489
U.S. 803 (1989) was decided (decided Mar. 28, 1989).
162. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
163. See 496 U.S. at 171-72.
164. See id. at 172.
165. See id. at 173.
166. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
167. 496 U.S. at 173.
168. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). See supranote 145.
169. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 174-76 (1990).
170. See id. at 200 (remanding for a determination of what relief was entitled
petitioners for their 1987-88 HUE tax payments).
171. See, e.g., Koch, supra note 151 at 1046 ("The three opinions in American
Trucking make it difficult to evaluate the durability of the Court's prospectivity
doctrine.").
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a plurality opinion; 1" (2) the Court had recently eliminated prospective
judicial ruling in the criminal sphere;'" and (3) on the same day that the
Court handed down the American Trucking decision the Court also issued
a seemingly contradictory companion decision-McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco.174
Writing for the plurality in American Trucking, Justice O'Connor
stated that "the Court has never equated its retroactivity principles with
remedial principles."'" Instead she insisted that a retroactivity issue
always involves a temporal choice-of-law question.176 According to
Justice O'Connor, when on the rare occasion that a new law is
announced-for example, when the Court reverses itself, as opposed to
when the Court applies a settled principle to a controversy before
it'--the court announcing that rule is presented with a choice. It must
either apply the new rule from that time forward (thus applying the prior
rule to conduct that occurred before the new rule was announced) or apply
it retroactively. 78
b. McKesson: Due Process and Retroactivity
In contrast, McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco,'" a unanimous decision written by Justice Brennan and handed
down in tandem with the American Trucking decision," 8° dealt with the
permissible limits of a state's remedial measures when the state had
collected taxes unconstitutionally."' As a result of an earlier Supreme
Court decision, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias," which held that a
Hawaiian excise tax scheme favoring local alcoholic beverage producers
172. The plurality opinion was written by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Kennedy. Justice Scalia concurred in the result.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and
Justice Blackmun joined. 496 U.S. 167.
173. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
174. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
175. 496 U.S. at 189.
176. See id. at 188-200.
177. For example, when the Court reverses itself, as opposed to when the Court
applies a settled principle to a controversy before it. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534 (1991).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See 496 U.S. at 188-200.
496 U.S. 18 (1990).
American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 176; McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 26.
See 496 U.S. 18.
468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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was a violation of the Commerce Clause,"n the State of Florida revised
its similar excise tax scheme.'
The revision was an exercise of form
over substance. The Florida legislature merely "deleted the previous
express preferences for 'Florida-grown' products and replaced them with
special rate reductions for certain specified citrus, grape, and sugarcane
products, all of which are commonly grown in Florida and used in
alcoholic beverages produced there."" The plaintiff paid the tax and
subsequently sued for injunctive relief and a refund. 86 The Florida trial
court invalidated the tax, labelling it unconstitutional, but declined to order
a refund. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed."
On a writ of
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed.188
The McKesson court acknowledged that a state's "exceedingly strong
interest in financial stability" allows it to "employ various financial
sanctions and summary remedies ... in order to encourage taxpayers to
make timely payments prior to the resolution" of a tax dispute."1 The
Court pointed out that "'[t]he rule being established [is] that apart from
special circumstances[, the taxpayer] cannot interfere by injunction with
the State's collection of its revenues, [and] an action at law to recover
back what [the taxpayer] paid is the alternative left.'""' Thus, the
taxpayer is effectively limited to post-deprivation process. 19 ' The
McKesson Court elucidated the requirements of the post deprivation
process:
If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax
when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in
183. See 486 U.S. at 273.
184. See McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 23.
185. Id. at 23.
186. See id. at 24-25.
187. See id. at 25-26.
188. See id. at 26, 42.
189. Id. at 37. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that
due process requirements dictate an analysis of the affected private interest, the
government interest, and the risk of erroneous deprivation, and that a hearing conducted
after the deprivation of a property interest can satisfy can due process). The Mathews
Court indicated that retroactive payment was the proper remedy due a claimant upon a
favorable post-deprivation finding.
"Should it be determined at any point after
termination of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended beyond the date of
cessation initially established, the worker is entitled to retroactive payments." Id. at 339.
190. 496 U.S. at 32 (quoting Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S.
280, 285 (1912)).
191. See id. at 38-39.
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which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide

meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional
deprivation."
c. Beam: A Further Attempt at Resolution
The third case, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,1" like
American Trucking, also concerned a state tax instituted in reliance on
"settled" law subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court.194 Beam
was yet another plurality decision, and it was even murkier than American
Trucking.195 In contrast to American Trucking, Beam appeared to

overrule the use of non-retroactivity with respect to federal law." Just
as Hawaii had done, the State of Georgia also imposed an excise tax
which favored local producers of alcoholic beverages. The imposition of
the discriminatory tax was based upon an understanding that the Twentyfirst Amendment provided the states with "heightened" powers to regulate
the trade in liquor. 1" After the Supreme Court, in Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias,19 held that the Hawaiian excise tax scheme violated the
Commerce Clause, an out-of-state liquor producer sued the State of

Georgia to recover the back taxes it had paid prior to the Bacchus

decision." 9 The state courts of Georgia applied the Chevron test,'
and as a result, determined that the equities permitted the State to refuse

192. Id. at 31 (citation omitted).
193. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
194. Id. Coincidentally, the overturning case was again Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
195. See 501 U.S. 529. The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court was
written by Justice Souter, with only Justice Stevens joining. Justice White filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in which Justice Marshall and Justice Scalia joined. Justice Scalia filed an
opinion in which Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmunjoined. Justice O'Connor filed
a dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined.
196. See id. "[We hold that it is] error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law
retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so .... Assuming that
pure prospectivity may be had at all ...its scope must necessarily be limited to a small
number of cases .... ." Id. at 540, 541.
197. See id. at 532-33.

198. 468 U.S. 263.
199. See James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 532.
200. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). See also supra
note 145.
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a refund for the years prior to the Bacchus decision. 1 The Supreme
Court reversed.'
Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Beam, pointed out that
although the Bacchus Court had not ordered Hawaii to make a refund, the
Court had nonetheless applied the announced rule in that decision to the
parties before it. 3 He stated that "the Bacchus opinion did not reserve
the question whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it
....
"I
Justice Souter further stated that the Court correctly remanded
the remedy determination to the State of Hawaii
due to the intertwined
5
nature of remedial matters with state law.
Justice Souter argued that "selective prospectivity also breaches the
principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a
fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law
generally. "I
This was true, he said, for civil as well as for criminal
proceedings. 7 Justice Souter concluded, "it is error to refuse to apply
a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has
already done so,"2°
and thus apparently overruled selective
prospectivity.?
4. Harper: An Attempt to Sort it All Out
Four years after Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, where
the Court held that it was unconstitutional for a state to exempt the
pensions of its own retired workers from income tax while simultaneously
taxing federal pensions,2 1° and after the McKesson, the American
Trucking and the Beam decisions which raised questions about the viability
201. See 501 U.S. at 533.
202. ld. at 534.
203. See id. at 539.
204. Id.

205. See id. at 535, 538.
206. Id. at 537.
207. Id. at 540.
208. Id.
209. The opinion did not overrule pure prospectivity. In several places, Justice
Souter seemed to make arguments in favor of retaining the "pure" form of the doctrine.
See e.g., id. at 541 (stating that in a civil context pure prospectivity may not deprive a
litigant of all relief and also that pure prospectivity must be limited in scope).
210. See supratext accompanying notes 1-9.
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of the doctrine of non-retroactivity, 1 the Supreme Court handed down
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation.12 Harper held that Davis

applied retroactively." 3

In so doing the Court seemingly landed a

knock-out blow to the fiscal well-being of the states involved in the Davis-

spawned
litigation, and to states involved in other tax-related litigation as
214
well.
Harper was initiated by federal pensioners in Virginia who claimed

that Davis entitled them to tax refunds. 2 5' Like other states in which
similar post-Davis taxpayer suits had occurred, Virginia hoped to limit the
Davis rule to a prospective application and avoid paying refunds. 1 6
Because the offending tax was a violation of intergovernmental tax
immunity rather than a per se violation of pensioners' rights,2 7 and
because the State of Michigan in Davis, "conceded that a refund is
appropriate," 2 8 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the rule
of James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia219 did not apply because the
question of retroactivity had not been litigated, thus leaving it free to

apply the Chevron test.'

As a result, the Virginia Court determined

that taxpayer relief need only be prospective. 2 '

211. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Supreme Court Settles Some State Tax Issues
While Creating Other Problems, 75 J. TAX'N 180, 180-81 (Sept. 1991) (arguing that the
Beam decision raises as may questions as it answers); Koch, supra note 151, at 1045
(expressing hope that the yet undecided Beam would clear up the uncertainty concerning
the doctrine of prospectivity created by the Smith and McKesson opinions). See generally
supra notes 158-209 and accompanying text.
212. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
213. Id. at 2519.
214. See, e.g., Harvey Berkman et al., Sentencing Commission CriticalofReforms,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7, 1994, at 5, (stating that "[a]t stake [in Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 92-1384] is about $4 billion in possible tax refunds by California and
the good will of the international trading community.").
215. See Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2514.
216. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices Weigh Refunds ofillegal Tax, WASH. POST,
Dec. 3, 1992, at A4 (describing the Virginia State Attorney General's argument that a
refund of such proportions would pose a hardship to the state).
217. See supra notes 29-97 and accompanying text.
218. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989).
219. See supra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
220. See Harper, 113 S.Ct at 2514.
221. See id.
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Justice Thomas, in his three-part majority opinion,' rejected the
Virginia Court's conclusions, stating that, "[flar from reserving the
retroactivity question, our response to the appellee's concession [in Davis]
constituted a retroactive application of the rule announced in Davis to the
parties before the Court."' Echoing Beam, the Harper Court held:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before
it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and
must be given fall retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such
events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule. This
rule extends... [the] ban against "selective application of new
rules."'
Thus the Court eliminated all non-retroactive ruling except, theoretically,
for pure prospectivity.2 2 5
Justice Thomas did not end the Harperopinion with the rejection of
selective non-retroactivity.'
He proceeded, in part I of the decision,
to repeat the due process admonitions of McKesson.-' In the last part
of the Harper decision Justice Thomas wrote:
Because we have decided that Davis applies retroactively to the
tax years at issue . we reverse the judgment below. We do
not enter judgment for the petitioners, however, because federal
law does not necessarily entitle them to a refund. Rather, the
Constitution requires Virginia 'to provide relief consistent with
federal due process principles.' . . . If Virginia "offers a
222. Part I of the opinion described the procedural background of the case Id. at
2513-16; part II dealt with retrospectivity Id. at 2516-18; and part IIIaddressed due
process considerations relating to the need for provision of adequate post-deprivation
remedy. Id. 2518-20.
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, Scalia, and Souter joined, and in Parts I and III of which Justices White and
Kennedy joined. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice White
joined. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist

joined. Id.
223. Id. at 2518.

224. Id. at 2517.
225. Id. See supranotes 113-15 and accompanying text (describing three forms of
judicial rule-making).
226. Id. at 2518-20.
227. Id.
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meaningful opportunity for taxpayers to withhold contested tax
assessments and to challenge their validity in a predeprivation
hearing,' the 'availability of a predeprivation hearing constitutes
a procedural safeguard . . . sufficient by itself to satisfy the Due
Process Clause."'

M. AFTER HARPER
A. The States' Response to Harper
After Harper was decided, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments

in pending similar cases and remanded those cases in consideration of

Harper. 9 Yet, just as the post-Davis tax cases did not apply Davis
uniformly,' and possibly as a result of the Court's dicta in the last

section of the Harper opinion," the affected states did not apply Harper
uniformly. Some state courts ordered a refund 32 In other states, the
tax authorities simply directed that the monies be refunded without further
challenge 33 However, some states, possibly out of desperation found
hope in the words "federal law does not necessarily entitle [the taxpayers]
They resisted providing refunds to federal pensioners. 3
to a refund."'

228. Id. at 2519 (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181
(1990) and McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S.
18, 38 n.21 (1990)) (citations omitted).
229. See, e.g., Bass v. South Carolina, 414 S.E.2d 110 (S.C. 1992), vacated, 113
S. Ct. 3025 (1993) (case remanded for further consideration in light of Harper);Swanson
v. North Carolina, 410 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 3025 (1993) (case
remanded for further consideration in light of Harper);Duffy v. Wetzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d
684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 3027 (1993) (case remanded for further
consideration in light of Harper).
230. See supra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Hagge v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Fin., 504 N.W.2d 448 (Iowa
1993) (ordering a modified refund).
233. See, e.g., Public Plans:Wisconsin Commission Orders State To Refund Taxes
To FederalRetirees, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP., June 2, 1993.
234. Harperv. Virginia, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2519 (1993).
235. See, e.g., Martin Fox, State Resists Refunding Tax to Pensioners,N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 25, 1993, at 1, 5 (indicating New York State and New York City may claim that
adequate pre-deprivation process had been afforded the federal pensioners).
The State of Virginia has itself so far refused to refund money the its aggrieved
taxpayers. See Steve Bates, Court Denies Refund to Va. 's FederalRetirees, WASH.
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Those states which declined to make refunds offered several reasons

for their refusal. One argument was that a violation of intergovernmental
tax immunity,

taxpayer.

6

in theory, injures the federal government, not the

It followed, therefore, that the remedy need not necessarily

look to the taxpayer, but rather to the federal government. Moreover,
Harper left it to the Supreme Court of Virginia to fashion a remedy, 7
pointedly referring to the fact that "federal law does not necessarily entitle
[the pensioners] to a refund.""
Additionally, at least one state denied
a refund on separate state grounds.2 9
As another alternative to providing relief in the form of a refund, The
Harperopinion itself suggested the remedy of extending a discriminatory
exemption favoring the federal pensioners.'
The McKesson Court
pointed out that a state could fashion a remedy whereby it retained the tax
but eliminated its discriminatory nature by applying it retroactively to the
class previously favored. 2' Interestingly, there are, as yet, no reports
of a state taking either action.
PosT, Jan. 11, 1994, at C1 ("An Alexandria judge has ruled that Virginia does not
have to refund nearly $500 million in income taxes collected on federal pensions, saying
the retirees could have protested the tax before paying it.").
236. See, e.g., Graves v. New York ax rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). The
Graves court stated:
The theory of the tax immunity of either government, state or national, and its
instrumentalities, from taxation by the other, has been rested upon an implied
limitation on the taxing power of each, such as to forestall undue interference,
through the exercise of that power, with the governmental activities of the
other.
Id. at 477-78.
237. See 113 S. Ct. at 2519-20
238. Id. at 2519.
239. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 437 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. 1993)
(affirming, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the state trial court's
ruling that the liquor distributor was not entitled to a refund on the independent state
grounds that it lacked standing because the cost of the offending tax was passed to the
wholesalers, and, in the alternative, that sufficient pre-deprivation process was available
to the appellant). But see McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 47 (1990) (rejecting the argument that an illegal tax had been
passed-onto customers, indicating a "highly sophisticated theoretical and factual inquiry"
is required to prove such a claim, and the refund was not a "windfall" because the injury
made the petitioner poorer and put the petitioner at an economic disadvantage).
240. Harperv. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2520 (1993) (quoting
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 818 (1989)).
241. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S.
18, 39-40 (1990).
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Reich v. Collins,' a Davis-spawned case which was vacated and
remanded by the United States Supreme Court for further consideration in

light of Harper, is a typical example of a state court's continued refusal
to provide a tax refund.'

3

On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court held

that the taxpayer received sufficient pre-deprivation relief.'

Referring

with approval to its latest decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.

Georgia,'45 the Reich court found that "the declaratory judgment remedies
...as well

as statutory injunctive relief remedies... provide meaningful

opportunities to taxpayers to litigate the validity of taxes alleged owing
prior to the time when the taxes fell due."'
The court also found the
due process requirements satisfied by the availability of an administrative
tax hearing.247
Justice Carley's dissent in Reich found no such meaningful relief." 8
He pointed out that the direct appeal from an assessment permitted by
Georgia law also required the taxpayer to "file a surety bond or other
security."'
The Justice also argued that the majority's remedies were

perhaps inappropriate and that nothing in the tax statutes authorized a
taxpayer to withhold payment while contesting a tax.2'0
242. 437 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1993).
243. See id.
244. Id. at 321-22.
245. 437 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. 1993). The case was decided on Dec. 2, 1993, the same
day that Reich was handed down.
246. 437 S.E.2d at 321.
247. Id. at 322.
248. Id. at 323-25 (Carley, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 323 (Carley, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 324 (Carley, J., dissenting). But cf Brief for Defendants-Appellants
Wetzler, Che and Regan at 13-17, Duffy v. Wetzler, 93-07800 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
Upon remand in light of Harper, the State and City of New York argued that New
York's federal pensioners were not entitled to a refund because they had access to
sufficient pre-deprivation relief. The appellants contended that the plaintiff taxpayers
could have sought a declaratory judgment prior to retirement, or, upon retirement, could
have withheld taxes while seeking such relief. In addition, the appellant stated the
taxpayers could have withheld payment and obtained an administrative deficiency
determination which is subsequently reviewable by a state court. The appellants further
contended that there was no duress because the "the State Department of Tax and
Finance has not for at least a decade required a bond be posted," id. at 16, because
accrued interest is "not punitive and merely compensates the State for the taxpayer's use
of its money," id. at 17, and "penalties authorized by the statute are all waivable for
reasonable cause where the taxpayer has acted in good faith." Id.
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On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court expressed its agreement
with Justice Carley by delivering a sharp rebuke to the Georgia State
Supreme Court. 1 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor
stated that:
[a state] has the flexibility to maintain an exclusively
predeprivation remedial scheme, so long as the scheme is "clear
and certain." Due process .. also allows the State to maintain
an exclusively postdeprivation regime, or a hybrid regime. A
State is free as well to reconfigure its remedial scheme over time,
to fit its changing needs. z2
Yet, Justice O'Connor indicated that it would be unfair to reconfigure
state law in mid-stream. 3 Referring to the period of time in question,
Justice O'Connor stated that the "average taxpayer" would obviously
interpret Georgia law to entitle the taxpayer to a refund of an illegally
collected tax.' Justice O'Connor also pointed out that Georgia had not
previously required a refund-seeking taxpayer to lodge a protest prior to
paying the tax and then bringing an action against the stateY At one
point, Justice O'Connor likened the tactic used by the Georgia State
Supreme Court to that of a sleazy used car salesman, characterizing the
Georgia opinion as "'bait and switch."' ' 6
B. The Lesson of Davis and Harper
It must not be; there is no power in Venice
Can alter a decree established:
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the state: it cannot be. 57
A "basic principle [of American jurisprudence is] that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and
that principle has ever since been respected . . . as a permanent and
251. Reich v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 547 (1994).
252. Id. at 550 (citations omitted).
253. Id.
254.
255.
256.
257.
(William

Id.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 550.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, so. 1, lines 218-22

G. Clark & William A. Wright eds., MacMillan 1900) (1984).
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indispensable feature of our constitutional system. "However, in
deciding Reich the state courts of Georgia did not seem to demonstrate a
great deal of respect for the Supreme Court's exposition of law.Y 9
Moreover, the State of Georgia was by no means alone in its failure to
follow precepts laid down by the Supreme Court. Several other states
used the same tactic as Georgia, seeking any way possible to elude refund
liability to their federal pensioners.'
Nor were the pension refund eases of Georgia, New York and other
states, which grew out of Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasuy' 1
and Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,62 the only tax cases in
which the states declined to refund illegally collected taxes in the face of
a contrary federal law. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverages and Tobacco' is an example of a similar attempt, by the
State of Florida, to avoid paying a refund.'
For that matter, Harper
v. Virginia serves as a paradigm of state recalcitrance in the face of
overwhelming federal law to the contrary.
In light of the extensive body of case law on intergovernmental tax
immun_-caselaw which stretches back in time almost to the birth of this
NationS -one would be hard-pressed to give credence to an argument
claiming that the rule of Davis should be applied prospectively merely
because Davis's outcome satisfies the three-part Chevron test.' In fact,
Davis did not satisfy the first prong of the Chevron test because it did not
"establish a new principle of law;" it neither overruled "clear past
precedent" nor decided "an issue of first impression whose resolution was
258. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
259. See supra notes 248-253 and accompanying text. Indeed, on remand, the
Georgia Supreme Court's decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 437
S.E.2d 782 (Ga. 1993), which was handed down on the same day as the subsequently
overturned Reich decision and which similarly denied a tax refund (based on independent
state grounds), also smacks of an attempt at any cost to avoid ordering a painful refund.
260. See, e.g., discussion supra note 246 (reviewing New York State's arguments
in favor of denying refunds to federal pensioners).
261. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
262.
263.
264.
265.

113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
496 U.S. 18 (1990).
See supra text accompanying notes 179-92.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-79.

266. See supra note 145.
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Davis "clearly show[ed] that the Doctrine
not clearly foreshadowed."'
of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity has been applied for decades."'
That group of cases-Harper, McKesson, Reich, et al.-was not a

shining episode in American jurisprudence. It seemed as if the judges
sitting in those state courts refused to take away any lessons from the
decisions of the Supreme Court. Their treatment of precedent was so
cavalier that it "confuse[d] law students and [shook] their confidence in
their books .... ,,"
Why did the state courts ignore the direction given them by the
Supreme Court? Was the judiciary of those states guilty of willful
behavior, or is there a less sinister explanation? A cynic might argue that
such decision-making is not first-rate jurisprudence, but that it is the stuff
of smart parochial politics. After all, Harper imposed a "crushing and
For example, the possible fiscal
unnecessary liability" on the states.'
consequences of Harperincluded the necessity of making huge tax refunds
and the concomitant scramble to replace desperately needed lost
revenue.2' It would be an understandably human reaction for a state
267. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (citation omitted).
268. Pledger v. Bosnick, 811 S.W.2d 286, 293 (Ark. 1991) (rejecting as inapposite
the use of a Chevron analysis and affirming an order of the Arkansas Chancery Court
that relied on Davis in ordering a refund of unconstitutionally collected pension taxes).
"The fact that this issue has never been before . . the Supreme Court ... does not
make this a new principle of law or a case of first impression, just a fresh statement of
the applicability of a long standing doctrine." Id.
269. THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNE rr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
346 (5th ed. 1956). The above-mentioned quotation is to be found in the chapter of
Plucknett's book that discusses the common-law development of the principle of
precedent. Plucknett's words paraphrase a remark made by Chief Justice Prisot in 1454.
Prisot stated that "'it would be a bad example to the young apprentices"' to reach a
conclusion that was contrary to many prior decisions. Plucknett uses Prisot's words to
point out that judges strove for jurisprudential consistency even during the nascent years
of the common law. It is, Plucknett states, "perhaps ... another way of saying that
even a mere student in reading the case would detect its inconsistency with established
principle, and would perhaps hardly credit what he read." Id. at 342-46.
270. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2526 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
271. See, e.g., Donald P. Baker, Ruling May Force Va. to Refund Taxes on U.S.
Pensions, WASH. POST, June 19, 1993, § D, at 1 (describing the dire fiscal consequences
of a refund). Prior to the Harperdecision, it was estimated Virginia had a "refund
exposure of $467 million and the total estimated refund exposure of all states involved
in Davis-related litigation . . . [was] $1.8 billion." Harper Oral Argument Addresses
TaxpayerRemedy, TAX ADMINS. NEWS (Federation of Tax Administrators, Washington,
D.C.), December, 1992, at 136, 137.
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judge, faced with such repercussions, to decline to impose that burden on
his or her home state.'
If such a viewpoint is indeed correct, the consequences would be more
serious than the confusion experienced by law students. It would
represent the subversive introduction of "chaos into the legal system..
. ."I3 However, it is unlikely that such a cynical assessment is correct.
The odds militate against so many state judges acting out of political
expediency rather than out of a sense of duty engendered by the
Constitutional principles of this nation. One suspects that most judges,
like most people, want to believe their behavior is above reproachY 4
Yet to say that most state judges do not intentionally ignore Supreme
Court precedent simply begs the question; it does nothing to explain why
many state courts do not follow seemingly obvious rulings of the Supreme
Court. The answer may be less sinister than wilful disregard of Supreme
Court precedent, although equally disturbing. Another explanation is that
perhaps the state judges, trying as best they could to fashion a satisfactory
solution to a disastrous and seemingly intractable dilemma, experienced
a sort of jurisprudential cognitive dissonance,' the result of which was
to find in the Supreme Court opinions meanings that were not in fact
there. In other words, perhaps they saw what they needed to see. Judges,
after all, are no less vulnerable to psychological phenomena than the rest
of humanity.
The Supreme Court's curious approach to its own precedent could
very well have been the factor that tipped the state courts toward
reinterpretation and away from docile obedience. No doubt many state
judges experienced conflict when they found themselves faced with such
discordant Supreme Court opinion. The state judges were required to
choose between, on the one hand, an argument that favored the fiscal
272. Of course, a truly cynical view of the Davis and Harpercases would be one
that viewed the holdings of the state court judges as predictable in light of their obvious
sympathy-as future state pensioners themselves-for the states' point of view and the
outcome in the Supreme Court as the product of future federal pensioners.
273. see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTINo OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 157 (1990).

The former Circuit Court judge argues that it is

necessary for Supreme Court justices to re-examine precedent, although "lower courts
are not free to ignore what the Supreme Court has said .... " Id. at 155-56.
274. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 126-35 (1995) (suggesting
that judges derive the greatest satisfaction from the process ofjudging by adhering to the
rules of that process).
275. Cognitive dissonance is the "term for the mental conflict that occurs when a
person encounters anything discordant with his beliefs; the conflict can be resolved by
changing the belief or-only too often-by reinterpreting the discordant material to make
it consistent with the belief." STUART SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

OF PSYCHOLOGY 77 (1989).
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well-being of their own state, and on the other hand, a mandate that
required them to hurt their state by adhering to the precedent of the
Supreme Court, a Court that seemed to have little regard for its own
precedentY 6
Of course, those Justices of the Supreme Court who chose to affirm
intergovernmental tax immunity and to eliminate selective prospectivity no
doubt see the matter from a different perspective. In his concurring
opinion in Harper, Justice Scalia argued that his agreement with the
rejection of selective prospectivity was based upon his reverence for the
principle of stare decisis.'
He stated that the doctrine of stare decisis
was flexible and did not apply as strongly when the underlying logic of a
precedent had been undercut,278 as had the support for the civil
prospectivity doctrine been undercut when the Court previously rejected
the use of the doctrine in the criminal sphereY 9 He also said he saw
"[p]rospective decisionmaking... as a practical tool of judicial activism,
born out of disregard for stare decisis."'
In his relatively brief
concurrence in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, Justice Scalia
asserted that selective prospectivity is not permitted by the Constitution
because a judge does not make law but rather finds it; therefore a judge
should simply apply the law as found instead of making choices about
which law to apply."
Such arguments are very much in accord with the beliefs of
proponents of the "original understanding."' Robert Bork, like Justice
276. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2528 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Court's rejection of selective
prospectivity in James B. Beam and in Harper "was not only contrary to precedent, but
also so rigid that it produced unconscionable results").
277. See Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2520-24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
278. See id. at 2520-21.
279. See id.
280. Id.at 2522.
281. See 501 U.S. 529, 548-49 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see POSNER,
supra note 105, at 24-25 (arguing that Blackstone's view of the role ofjudge as a neutral
transmitter of the law was merely a rationalization for judicial creativity).
282. See BORK, supra note 273, at 155-60 (describing the status of the precedent
principle within the approach to Constitutional Law taken by those who espouse the
original understanding). An "original understanding" of the Constitution is defined as
"what the public of [the time the Constitution was adopted] understood the words to
mean." Id.at 144.
Historically, it is not unique for people to look backward to an idealized vision of
a past, higher law. "[King] Cnut's laws were long popular in England, and in after years
men looked back with respect to his reign," and later in time, Bracton used the plea rolls
to discover the ancient cases which he supposed were purer statements of the law than
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Scalia, argues that the principle of stare decisis is flexible, by which he
means that a previous decision can be overruled if it is not good precedent
for the reason that the constitutional amendment process is difficult.'
Of course to Bork, the Constitution itself is good precedent;2 so too are
"precedents set by courts within a few decades of a provision's ratification
since the judges of that time presumably had a superior knowledge of the
original meaning of the Constitution."'
Rules that are wrong but that
are nonetheless "so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private
and public expectations of individuals and institutions ... should not be
changed now," 6 although they should not be "followed in the
future. "I
But rules that are wrong and that "remain unaccepted and
unacceptable
to large segments of the body politic" should be
8

changed.2

Robert Bork's and Justice Antonin Scalia's views on precedent suggest
the logic that impelled the Supreme Court to affirm, in Davis, the flawed
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, and to reject, in Harper, the
useful, if limited, doctrine of prospectivity. The intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine, which was reaffirmed in Davis v. Michigan
Department of Treasury, 9 had roots (though only in dicta) in
McCulloch v. Maryland,' which was decided within a few decades of
Constitution's ratification. By the lights of originalism, this made the
doctrine a superior form of precedent,"' as if it had been touched by the
true cross. Never mind that the underlying logic of the doctrine had long
since been shown to be nothing more than a pernicious abstraction.'
The "original understanding" also provided justification for the
relentless attacks upon the doctrine of prospectivity-first in McKesson
Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco and American
the corrupt doctrine of his time. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 269, at 10, 342-45.
283. See BORK, supra note 273, at 156.
284. See id.
285. Id. at 157.
286. Id. at 158.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 489 U.S. 803 (1989). Much of the majority opinion in Davis was a
straightforward discussion of the long line of cases which presaged the Davis holding,
The dissenting opinion did not dispute the import of those cases, but rather the basis for
the doctrine.
290. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819); see also discussion supra note 2.
291. See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50, 69-70, 89-94.
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Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith,'

then in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.

Georgia,'
and finally in Harper v. Virginia Department of
Taxation.1 Unlike intergovernmental tax immunity, the prospectivity
doctrine had a poor pedigree, having been originated less than thirty years

earlier.2'

In one plurality opinion after another, certain members of the

Court hammered away at the doctrine even though it had been clearly

settled in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson barely a generation prior to
Harper.'

At one point in his concurring opinion in Harper, Justice

Scalia offered the following criticism of the doctrine: "It is so un-ancient
that one of the current members of the Court was sitting when it was
invented. ""
Also, it was at best disingenuous for the Court to have chosen Harper
as the weapon with which to attack the prospectivity doctrine. In view of
the long, albeit flawed, line of cases that supported the Davis decision, it
can fairly be said that Virginia and the other states that claimed Davis
represented "new" law had come to the battle armed with peashooters.'
In fact, Harper was little more than a straw man. By using
it to overrule Chevron the Court avoided the hard case where the facts
might cry out for the equitable application of the prospectivity doctrine.
Such a case may be where, for example, a deserving litigant who had the
misfortune to bring the right lawsuit at the wrong time might be cheated
out of the opportunity to obtain a remedy.'
293. See supra notes 141-92 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 210-28 and accompanying text.
296. See supra text accompanying note 281.
297. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
298. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2522 (1993) (Scalia,
., concurring).
299. See Pledger v. Bosnick, 811 S.W.2d 286, 293 (Ark. 1991-) (pointing out that
"[a] review of the extensive historical discussion in Davis will clearly show that the
Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity has been applied for decades").
300. See, e.g., Hyde v. Reynoldsville Casket Co., 626 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio 1994).
Hyde could have been such a case. It was factually closer to Chevron than it was to
Harper. In Hyde the plaintiff relied upon an Ohio law that tolled the statute of
limitations for out-of-state residents. Id. at 76. After commencement of the lawsuit, the
United States Supreme Court, in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486
U.S. 888 (1988), declared the Ohio tolling statute unconstitutional.
However, in deciding Hyde, the Ohio Supreme Court, like the states involved in the
tax litigation, either misinterpreted Harperor willfully ignored it. It flat-out refused to
follow Bendix. The Hyde Court held that "[w]hether or not the Chevron test remains
good law today, we hold that Bendix may not be retroactively applied to bar claims
which had accrued prior to the announcement of that decision." 626 N.E.2d at 79. It
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Thus the lessons of the Supreme Court's Davis/Harperline of cases
might not be the lessons that were in fact intended by the Court. In law
as in religion, there is always the chance that a group's fervently believed
dogma is indeed true. Yet there is an even greater chance that nonbelievers will view such faith to be the result of egocentricity and
arrogance. On the basis of the original understanding, Justices Scalia and
Thomas might feel perfectly justified in affirming ill-founded law and in
overturning the settled law of a recent time-a time, by coincidence, when
most members of the Supreme Court had a decidedly non-originalist
judicial philosophy. It was a coincidence remarked upon by Justice
O'Connor, 1 and noticed no doubt by many state judges as well.
Proponents of the original understanding have argued that they act out
of their own deep respect for "good" precedent when they overturn a
"bad" precedent that overruled a "good" one.'
But the point they
make may be missed by a state judge who must decide whether or not to
injure his state's fiscal well-being. Indeed the distinction might at best be
viewed as a pernicious abstraction. At worst it might seem to some to be
suspiciously similar to what happens in a legislature when one party wrests
control from another party that has held power for some time-sleeves are
rolled up in eager anticipation of the Herculean task of cleaning out the
Augean dirty work of the opposition. Perceiving the rationale for a
decision of the Supreme Court to be nothing more than a subterfuge for
an exercise of raw political power, a state judge whose dispassion is
already sorely tested might very easily find greater merit in a choice that
favors his or her own fiscally beleaguered state. As Judge Posner points
out, "rules bind because they are accepted, rather than being accepted
is noteworthy that the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust filed an amicus curiae brief in the
Hyde case. See id. at 76 n.1.
In a statute of limitations case like Hyde, the equities more strongly favor
prospective application of the prior decision. In the tax cases, whatever the outcome,
the taxpayer is afforded some measure of relief. If the prior ruling is applied
retroactively, the taxpayer gets both backward- and forward-looking relief. If the prior
ruling is only applied prospectively, the taxpayer still obtains forward-looking relief from
the unconstitutional tax. However, if the prior ruling is applied retroactively in a statute
of limitation case, a plaintiff who relied in good faith on the "old" law would be
completely foreclosed from litigating his or her claim.
301. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2528 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing to Justice Scalia's "undisguised hostility to an era
whose jurisprudence he finds distasteful").
302. See Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2522 (Scalia, J., concurring). "Prospective
decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare
decisis." Id.
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because they bind."'
A judicial institution that is seen as lacking
respect for its own prior decisions might have a difficult time gaining
respect for its current determinations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court chose to rely on long-established precedent in
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury,' a case brought and won
by a federal pensioner who claimed that a state income tax on his federal
pension was unconstitutional because the state exempted the pensions of
its own retired state workers. 5 The case presented a chance for the
Court to renounce the stale doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity,
a doctrine built on the shifting sands of faulty reasoning. The Court chose
to reaffirm it instead06
In spite of Davis, many states refused to provide refunds in similar tax
cases. They invoked the prospectivity doctrine to shield them from refund
liability.
The states claimed that Davis represented "new" law.
Furthermore, many of their state courts agreed with that analysis. The
Supreme Court, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,'
declined to point out the obvious-that Davis did not represent new law.
Instead it exploited the controversy, using it to take a final swipe at the
prospectivity doctrine. Although the states applied it beyond its narrow
and legitimate scope, the doctrine made more good sense as a temporal
choice of law vehicle, rather than as a factor to be used in determining
remedial issues. If the doctrine is not applied from a temporal choice of
law perspective, some people will never get the chance to obtain any
remedy. No matter how compelling their claim is, they will be foreclosed
from suing.30°
Following Harper, some state courts still refused to provide refunds
to their federal pensioners.'
An interesting question is why. Perhaps
the state judges disagreed with the Supreme Court and wilfully disregarded
the Court's mandates. It is, however, unlikely that so many judges would
shirk their Constitutional duty.3 10 Another, more credible answer is that
303. POSNER, supra note 271, at 133 (alluding to a statement made by
Wittgenstein).
304. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
305. See id.
306. See supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
307. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
308. See supra notes 210-28 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 229-56 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
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the state judges sincerely thought their conclusions were correct. They did
so because the dissonance created by the ruinous (to the states) Supreme
Court decisions, coupled with the appearance that those decisions were
born of arrogance, made it easy for the state judges to gloss over the
outcome of those cases. The Supreme Court, in deciding those cases, may
have been guided by the tenets of the original understanding, but the
lesson taken away by the state courts may have been that precedent
matters less than political expediency."
Robert J. Sweeney

311. See supra notes 273-303 and accompanying text.

